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The Practice of Teaching, the Practice of




Whenever I begin to think about the word practice, in con-
nection with teaching or lawyering, I recall one of my favorite
cartoons. It shows a priest seated at a piano and a bearded man
wearing a skull cap standing behind him, looking at the sheet
music. The caption reads, "A practicing Catholic and an obser-
vant Jew."
As a law teacher, I have to be sure you understand the
"holding" of the cartoon. The priest, who at the time in question
was "practicing" the piano, presumably also "practices" his re-
ligion; the "observer" of the piano-playing also presumably "ob-
serves" the tenets (indeed, the "practices") of his religion.
We often think of practice in the first sense, as regular re-
hearsals, whether for a particular performance or for undertak-
ing the work of an occupation, as in the case of a high school
"practice teacher." The maxim is "practice makes perfect," and
sometimes that may be so. Maybe. A childhood friend, having
"observed" my piano playing over some years, once commented
that I was getting better. When I happily responded, "Do you
think so?" he replied, "For sure. You used to play easy pieces
badly; now you play harder pieces badly." A less astringent un-
derstanding of the limited truth of the maxim is manifested in
* Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This
essay originated as the Charles Dyson Lecture, delivered at Pace University
School of Law on April 23, 2008. I am grateful to the School for the invitation, and
to Vanessa Merton, Professor of Law and Supervisor of the Immigration Justice
Clinic at Pace, for her role in that and for much more. She was a dear colleague for
six years at the founding of CUNY Law School, during which I learned more about
the meaning of the responsible practices of teaching and lawyering from the re-
markable group of students, teachers, and staff members we assembled than I can
recount or acknowledge, but from no one person more than from her. I am ever in
your debt, Vanessa; may your song always be sung.
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the experience of many of us that, with years of "practice," as we
move closer to being "perfect" at our craft, we "observe" perfec"'-
tion receding ever further along our path. With that latter wis-
dom, we approach an understanding of our work, not simply as
a skill that we practice to acquire, but as a practice in itself.
We need to inquire, then, what it is about lawyering and
teaching that makes it appropriate to term them "practices."
Our understanding of that question has been widely influenced
by the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. His carefully crafted defini-
tion is about seven lines long, but resonates with what I never
realized I thought.1 Let me describe its three core ingredients.
First, a practice involves what he terms a "coherent and
complex form of socially established co-operative human activ-
ity ...."2 This requirement, Macintyre observes, distinguishes
planting turnips from farming, arranging some bricks from ar-
chitecture, throwing a football around from playing the game of
football. 3 .
Second, through such activity, "goods internal to that form
of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those
standards of excellence"4 appropriate to it. Motivating a highly
intelligent seven-year-old child to learn the game of chess by
offering him fifty cents worth of candy for each game won may
induce the child to play, but not to improve his or her skill at
the game ifhe can learn to cheat without detection, since either
skill achieves equally the external good, the candy. However, as
MacIntyre suggests, only by trying to excel at the game can the
child achieve the goods internal to a developed proficiency at
chess.5 (For those who might wonder what those goods might
possibly be, I will digress briefly to mention MacIntyre's
description of them: "the achievement of a certain highly partic-
1. ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187 (3d
ed. 2007) ("By a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to
that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of ac-
tivity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human con-
ceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.").
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 187-88.
6. Id. at 188.
ular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competi-
tive intensity ...."6) He goes on to suggest-and this is not a
digression-that for any practice the good acquired will be "of a
certain highly particular" sort. 7
Finally, through the realization of those internal goods our
capacity to understand and master them more deeply is "sys-
tematically extended."8 It is through participation in the at-
tempts to sustain progress toward excellence that a practitioner
of a specific practice discovers the good of what MacIntyre
terms "a certain kind of life," the life of an artist, a carpenter, a
teacher, or a lawyer.9
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II.
What are the human goods that we may realize through
seeking to meet appropriate standards of excellence in the prac-
tices of lawyering and teaching, and in the process systemati-
cally extend our capacity more deeply to understand and master
those goods? Looking first at law, I will identify five that seem
salient to me; of course, I cannot claim that my catalogue will be
definitive.
The first is that a lawyer stands with those in trouble. I am
not talking about "zeal" or "loyalty" in the reified sense that we
often use those terms in professional responsibility law. There
is some significant room in an ethical universe for withholding
one's judgment of a client who is in more trouble than he or she
deserves or, desert apart, may have no one else standing be-
tween him or her and justice. Making an argument, or other-
wise advancing an interest that, but for your engagement on a
client's behalf, you would not want to prevail, is at times a fine
thing to do. So long as these principles are not mindlessly in-
voked in cases where they are grievously inapt, or turned into
abstractions to which you must be committed because of your




8. Id. at 187.
9. Id. at 190. Professor (and former Dean of Yale Law School) Anthony
Kronman has written of such goods provocatively, in my judgment, in the life of a
lawyer, in THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
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Second is the potential that law practice has to aid people
in navigating their way through obstacles in a wide range of
human contexts: forming businesses, enabling businesses or
family members to separate, obtaining governmental approvals
of various sorts, drafting agreements, wills, and letters-in
short, facilitating the passage of people through the rapids they
must traverse in this law-drenched world. The interests of the
people involved are sometimes mostly divergent, at other times
primarily congruent; a lawyer's help may be necessary in both
cases, and providing that help will often be a blessing, not only
to the client, but to the world.
Here, I am not focusing specifically on being a "lawyer for
the situation" or a mediator, nor on the developing "collabora-
tive law" movement, but have more generally in mind the op-
portunity that a lawyer can often have, although acting as
counsel for one of the parties, to enable his or her client, and the
other parties as well, to reach a goal they regard as a good out-
come. That is something that cap warrant real satisfaction. Of
course, there is a difference between what I have described and
throwing tacks in front of another person's car so that a client's
car can move around more freely-what in legal terms is draft-
ing documents to assure that in foreseen and unforeseen cir-
cumstances your client retains all favorable options, while the
other guy is left to twist slowly in the wind. That may be part of
the joy of law practice, but it is not what I am talking about.
The third theme is that the first two give a lawyer an op-
portunity-and here I will use a word that makes some
squirm-to empower the client. What do I mean by that? You
probably know the line that all of Western thought is a series of
footnotes to Plato. My favorite Platonic footnote call is in the
Gorgias, where Socrates says to Callicles, "Has any citizen hith-
erto become a better man through the influence of Callicles?"IO
Although Socrates' challenge was not addressed to a lawyer, it
is an especially striking one for lawyers. For the question calls
on us to ask, what does it mean to represent someone?
Of course, in our world, to say that part of a lawyer's job is
to help a client to become a better person immediately conjures
10. PLATO, GORGIAS *515 (Walter Hamilton trans., New York, Penguin Books
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up the specter of "paternalism," telling a client that he or she
will be better off going to jail for ten or twenty years or paying
or giving up the chance to obtain thousands (or millions) of dol-
lars. But it need not be thought of in such highly polarized
terms. It does not mean that clients should lose their homes,
their liberty, or their lives, even if they deserve it. It does mean
that there is more to representing a person than staving off dis-
aster or getting some property away from the other fellow.
What would it do to our idea of representing people if, although
it included protecting them from immediately threatened harm,
it did that in a way that enabled the client to remain or become
able to act as an enfranchised person in the world? The funda-
mental good of fostering that goal is eloquently brought to mind
by these classic words of Isaiah Berlin:
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not
on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the
instrument of my own, not of other men's, act of will. I
wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by rea-
sons, by conscious purposes, which are my own .... I
wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking,
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my
choices and able to explain them by reference to my
own ideas and purposes.ll
There is much in having "legal troubles" that tends to dis-
able one from realizing this aspiration, and legal representation
can ameliorate, rather than intensify, that disability. Where it
can, in the process, also help the client to understand his or her
self-interest as not always in polar opposition with the interest
of others and to recognize and accept limits on his or her anti-
social tendencies or desire for revenge, it serves an additional
human good.
The fourth theme is that advocacy in law is a relatively
peaceful way of seeking justice. Justice and peace are often
posed as competing goods, and law offers a way of "fighting"
without real violence. Of course law attracts people who have a
certain degree of aggressiveness in them, but it usually takes
verbal rather than physical forms-a Rule 11 motion rather
than fists, clubs, or knives. In a world that continues to see so
11. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 8 (1958).
12. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
much violence far worse than fists, clubs, and knives, verbal ag-
gression (even a Rule 11 motion) does not look quite so bad. Al-
though, as Robert Cover so arrestingly reminded us many years
ago, the ultimate power of law is its willingness to turn to vio-
lence;12 in many, many instances, it uses that willingness as an
unspoken means of calling disputants to account according to
non-violent procedures and to norms that to some significant
degree can claim to respond to the call of justice. From that
perspective, filing or moving to dismiss a complaint is a nonvio-
lent, albeit coercive, overture in support of a claim of justice.
Finally, practicing law is the pursuit of a craft that can be
endlessly challenging. Becoming better and better at tic-tac-toe
must lose its appeal at some point, while becoming better and
better at chess may remain, at least for some, perpetually re-
warding. Of course, there is a lot of law practice that is "the
same damned thing over and over," but I think you will readily
know what I mean about its endlessly challenging possibilities,
however seldom they may be realized. Law practice, moreover,
has the great added value, which chess does not, of having a
social purpose for one's skill. Although lawyers may be prone to
exaggerate their importance, law and law practice significantly
affect people's lives, for better and worse, and that can be a ma-
jor validation of the satisfaction that comes from mastery of the
craft.
What, now, are the salient internal goods of teaching? I
can approach that difficult question only by beginning with
what, in my judgment, they are not. The prevalent notion of
teaching, I believe-and this is especially so with respect to pro-
fessional schools-is that we transmit to students some of our
acquired knowledge and skills, which will be useful to them
later in their careers. We have the knowledge (provided that we
keep up our scholarship), our students need it, and, in teaching,
we "impart" what we have to them and so render them more
proficient. In criticizing this instrumental use of knowledge,
Robert Bellah has turned to a metaphor that I find distressingly
familiar: it tends, he asserts, "to make of the university a kind
34 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:29
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of universal filling station where students tank up on knowl-
edge they will 'need' later."13
Although I acknowledge that in this paradigm the goods
identified are internal to the practice of teaching-they are not
simply the rewards of job security, a certain status, and
favorable working conditions-I find the conception of teaching
it embodies woefully deficient. Specifically:
- It trivializes both knowledge and the utility ofknowl-
edge, first by overvaluing its utilitarian nature over its
intrinsic worth, then by focusing on narrow measures
of the benefits of an education. In the process, it loses
sight of the deeper value of knowledge-whether ofle-
gal doctrine, skills, history, or theory-as a means to
greater understanding of the world and of oneself.
- By seeking so heavily to justify present choices in
terms of the future, it excessively dichotomizes the
present and the future, thereby gravely disserving stu-
dents' capacity to learn to live intt;)grated lives.
- It both inflates and cabins, in troubling ways, the
work of the teacher: by exaggerating the value of ex-
pertise and authority, it denigrates and inhibits the
self-teaching capacities of students, at the same time
as it tends to render "off limits" a teacher's motivation
to engage more than the cognitive or argumentative
powers of his or her students.
- It distorts the authentic experience and motivation of
many teachers by fostering a view of research and
scholarship as augmenting a teacher's "human capi-
tal" and of teaching and other student-oriented work
as depleting it, thereby helping to erect a destructive
conflict of interest between teacher and student.
- It gives students an implicit model of the professional
relation that encourages them to adopt a comparably
crippling view of the attorney-client relation and an
implicit model of public life that is profoundly an-
tidemocratic and justificatory of inequality.
- Most fundamentally, it reifies both teacher and stu-
dent, in that it abstracts their roles as teachers and
13. Robert N. Bellah, The New Religious Consciousness and the Secular Uni-
versity, DAEDALUS, Fall 1974, at 110.
14. PLATO, MENa *84d-85c (G.M.A. Grube trans., Indianapolis, Hackett Pub-
lishing 1976).
students from their individual identities; it uses peo-
ple to teach things, not recognizing, as a wise friend
long ago said to me, that true teaching is using things
to teach people.
Curiously enough, the good of teaching that I want to artic-
ulate is embedded in one aspect of the etymology of the word,
educate: it is derived (I am told, for I know no Latin) from the
word, educere, to draw out something latent. To me, it revolu-
tionizes the idea of teaching to think of it as bringing out some-
thing that is in a student, rather than putting something in that
he or she lacks. When Socrates demonstrated, in the Meno,
that the slave-boy unknowingly knew that the square on the
diagonal of a square is double its area,14 to me he was accredit-
ing, not the latency of some forgotten prenatal knowledge or his
own ability to ask leading questions, but the ability to trans-
form oneself that is constitutive of being human. There is some-
where a magnificent line of Albert Schweitzer's, which, as best I
can remember it, says, "there is a physician within each of us,
and much of the practice of medicine is the art of bringing out
the physician in the sick person."
To draw out of students what is latent inside them, teach-
ers must, I believe, put more of themselves into their engage-
ment with the subject matter. In my better moments, I share
more fully with my students some of the aspirations for the at-
torney-client relation that have made it, at times, seem a fit
context in which to live a life. My goal is to invite my students
to ask themselves what being a lawyer means, or can come to
mean, to them. My aim is not to avow for its own sake a partic-
ular set of answers as the truth, nor to lead them to reach an-
swers like mine. It is rather to avow the appropriateness and
importance of asking the questions and engaging with whatever
answers that calls forth. Teaching, to me, "8 evoking that en-
gagement. The process of engagement is a relational, and not
merely an instrumental, interaction. It is not dominated by, al-
though it may contain, a desire to affect another's world view.
What it seeks to "impart" to students is an enhanced capacity to
36 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:29
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understand and develop their own selfhood. The delivery of
that "tank of gas" is, to me, the internal good of teaching.
In short-if it's not too late to be brief-to make of my
teaching a practice, to realize its internal goods, I need to facili-
tate my students' capacities to think of lawyering as a practice,
to consider what they might come to perceive as its internal
goods and how they might more fully enable themselves to real-
ize them.
In those efforts, mine and theirs, two sorts of barriers arise.
One is the product of the increasingly pervasive proclamation of
our culture that the important goods of any activity are self-
evidently those external to it. The other is the way in which the
concept of professional responsibility itself has (perversely, in
my judgment) come to lend apparent normative force to that
proclamation. To those barriers I now turn.
III.
In part, the credibility of the concept of internal goods is
undermined by the changing world of law practice. (I believe
that an analogous process has been increasingly at work in
teaching-making universities factories for the production and
marketing of knowledge-but I will not develop that thought
here.) Such fundamental factors as the endlessly increasing di-
vision of labor, bureaucratization, and hierarchy in the practice
setting make the individual lawyer a less and less significant
and informed cog in an increasingly large and complex set of
wheels. This phenomenon is hardly a recent development, but
the accelerating growth in size and complexity of law firms and
the runaway consolidation and rationalization of the business-
client world have made matters much worse. Legal representa-
tion is coming to be seen, within the bar as well as the corporate
world, as simply the production of a "product" delivered to the
client firm as a means of reducing its transaction costs in a se-
ries of complex bends in the corporate road and to be valued,
therefore, largely for its utility in quantitative monetary terms.
The clients' desire for "one-stop shopping" not only fuels the
growth of multidisciplinary practice, it is gradually-and less
and less gradually-affecting the thinking of lawyers and uni-
versities, pressing to affiliate the corporate practice of law more
with the range of professional consultant services available to
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mega-corporations than with brother and sister attorneys in
other practice fields and, more fundamentally, with the inher-
ited norms of the legal profession. These factors foster an in-
creasing detachment from the lawyer's own sense of craft or the
larger significance of the project of which the lawyer's work be-
comes an increasingly segmented part.
The influence of these inputs is broadly reinforced by the
corrosive effect of the wider culture. Law teacher and classicist
James Boyd White, in a fine essay initially addressed to law
students, has given us a salient description of the deeper mean-
ing of the commercialization of law practice-not such symp-
toms as advertising and firm marketing directors, but a
conception of professional life "in which attention is focused not
on the meaning ofwhat the lawyer is actually doing as a lawyer,
so much as upon the market for his services."15 White goes on:
"This in turn reflects a larger reconception of the nature of
human life, especially our shared life, as an essentially eco-
nomic activity, a process often described as one in which self-
interested actors rationally pursue their goals ...."16
We can, I suggest, recognize this as a description not
merely of law practice but of the world we live in and, increas-
ingly so, in the world we will be living in. In that world, there is
little to animate a focus on internal goods of any sort. Personal
relations, a care for craft and craft autonomy, a grounding of
reputation in the quality of one's work rather than the effective
demand for it-these and other like virtues cannot hold their
own in the blowing winds of market forces. Work life is seen not
only as a race, but as an endless series of races, large and small,
with success in one round soon recognized as achieving only a
qualification for entry into the next and with success identified
largely by comparing the money, prestige, or power obtained
with that of neighboring others. Like the candy hoard of the
seven-year-old chess cheat, that the rewards in fact be earned is
not required. In the incessant weighing of gains and losses, in-
ternal goods tend to appear as little more than consolation
prizes for losers, and Vince Lombardi's famous maxilTI (as best
15. James Boyd White, Meaning in the Life of the Lawyer, 26 CUMBo L. REV.
763, 765 (1995-1996).
16.Id.
as I can recall it), "Coming in second is being first among the
losers," is more and more the world's mantra.
In that environment, the concept of "responsibility" in the
practice of law, and indeed in that of teaching as well, is suffi-
ciently protean that it can serve to undermine further, as easily
as to bolster, a commitment to the pursuit of goods internal to
the practice.
The problem is, again, as old as Plato. His practitioner and
teacher of rhetoric, Gorgias, foreshadows contemporary lawyers
and educators. Claiming that the orator (today, let us say, law-
yer) has a skill that enables him to speak "against any opposi-
tion in such a way as to prevail on any topic he chooses," he
acknowledged that he was "bound to make a proper use of his
oratory ...."17 In his practice, the orator is a responsible agent.
His teacher, however, by whose efforts he "has acquired oratori-
cal skill," does not share in that responsibility. "[Hhs instruc-
tion was given to be employed for good ends," and he in no way
"deserves detestation."18
So, for the most part, it" is today. While Gorgias was
trapped by Socrates' rhetorical skill into momentarily asserting
that he would sometimes have to teach his pupils to use their
skills justlY,19 both the norms of university life and the formal
rules of the legal profession leave practitioners free of responsi-
bility for the harms caused by the wrongful use, by their alumni
and clients, of their teaching and representation. In both are-
nas, as you well know, the principal norm is one of non-
responsibility.20
To me, the core meaning of the idea of responsibility is the
recognition of the fact that the choices one makes as a lawyer,
like those one makes elsewhere in life, affect people's lives.
From this recognition flows the realization that our work, as
lawyers or as teachers of nascent lawyers, can be an affirma-
tion, or a negation, of the norms and goals that we want our
,~ .
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17. PLATO, GORGIAS, supra note 10, at *457.
18.Id.
19. Id. at *460.
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b), (d) cmt. 5, R. 4.1 cmt. 1, R.
4.4 cmt. 1 (2002). The earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility, still in
force here and there, is even more emphatic. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 7-10l(A)(l), EC 7-7, 7-8 (1980). It takes no citations to recognize that the
same is true of the practice of teaching.
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lives to embody. The Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh, a
vegetarian committed to the Buddhist principle of "right liveli-
hood," saw some comfort to be justly claimed by one who was a
teacher and not a butcher, yet went on soberly to acknowledge
that, through his children, the butcher would benefit from the
teacher's work. 21 He presumably would not have had the chil-
dren excluded from the classroom, and we do not know how he
would have responded to the awareness that they might well, in
their turn, become butchers.
In my view, the primary task of a law school should be to
help students explore the fuller meaning and implications of re-
sponsibility in law practice. Prevailing professional norms,
however, tend to cripple that endeavor at the outset. First,
those norms reflect and reinforce societal commodification of
the lawyer-client relation and a shriveled concept ofresponsibil-
ity. Second, the obsessive focus in both law schools and law
practice on rights, obligations, and the hierarchy of decisional
authority supports what Professor Joseph Allegretti has de-
scribed critically as the widespread inability to "envision a rela-
tionship between lawyers and clients in which one or the other
is not in charge of and dominant over the other."22 As he per-
ceives the prevalent norm, "[eJither the lawyer is in charge of
the relationship, or the lawyer ... regards himself as the un-
thinking instrument of the client."23
The challenge is to integrate one's own convictions with a
lively awareness that even the strongest convictions are per-
sonal, and that the manner of bringing them into one's interac-
tion with clients and students must reflect the realities of their
vulnerabilities. Enabling students or clients to become more
fully capable of taking responsibility for the effects of their work
is critically different from telling them that they should be re-
sponsible. It is essential to respect the personhood of our clients
and our students, who each bear primary responsibility for
their own life decisions. Yet recognition of these truths should
not end the matter. Leaving students or clients free to live their
21. THICH NHAT HANH, INTERBEING: FOURTEEN GUIDELINES FOR ENGAGED
BUDDHISM 45 (Fred Eppsteiner ed., 3d ed. 1998).
22. JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LE-
GAL PRACTICE 41 (1996).
23. Id. at 45.
,.
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lives as they think best does not warrant assuring them, tacitly
or explicitly, that they are free of the necessity to choose or to
accept facile reassurances that their choices are not morally
freighted. The task is to engage the moral agency of the other,
to invite him or her to reflection and, perhaps, to dialogue.
I cannot here develop more fully the contours of a responsi-
ble approach to counseling in law practice or to the interaction
between responsibility and values in law teaching.24 I will close
with a passage from the classic study of contemporary America,
Habits of the Heart, by Robert Bellah and his associates:
"Perhaps life is not a race whose only goal is being
foremost.... There are practices of life, good in them-
selves, that are inherently fulfilling. Perhaps work
that is intrinsically rewarding is better for human be-
ings than work that is only extrinsically rewarded.
Perhaps enduring commitment to those we love and
civic friendship toward our fellow citizens are prefera-
ble to restless competition and anxious self-defense.
Perhaps common worship, in which we express our
gratitude and wonder in the face of the mystery of be-
ing itself, is the most important thing of all. If so, we
will have to change our lives and begin to remember
what we have been happier to forget."25
To which I can only add, Amen. May it be so.
24. A very brief engagement with this question appears in Howard Lesnick,
The Integration of Responsibility and Values: Legal Education in an Alternative
Consciousness of Lawyering and Law, 10 NOVA L.J. 633, 641-44 (1986).
25. I owe appreciation of the salience of this passage to Professor and Dean
Emeritus Kenneth Penegar, who quoted it in his excellent critique. Kenneth L.
Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PrIT. L. REV. 307, 391 n.263
(1988) (quoting ROBERT N. BELLAH ET. AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 295 (1985)).
